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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Health  systems  worldwide  struggle  to meet  increasing  demands  for health  care,  and
Norway  is  no exception.  This paper  discusses  the  new,  comprehensive  framework  for pri-
ority  setting  recently  laid  out  by  the third  Norwegian  Committee  on Priority  Setting  in
the  Health  Sector.  The  framework  posits  that  priority  setting  should  pursue  the goal  of  “the
greatest  number  of  healthy  life  years  for  all,  fairly  distributed”  and  centres  on  three  criteria:
1)  The  health-beneﬁt  criterion:  The  priority  of  an intervention  increases  with  the expected
health  beneﬁt  (and  other  relevant  welfare  beneﬁts)  from  the  intervention;  2) The  resource
criterion:  The  priority  of an  intervention  increases,  the  less  resources  it requires;  and  3)  The
health-loss  criterion:  The  priority  of  an  intervention  increases  with  the  expected  lifetime
health loss  of  the  beneﬁciary  in the  absence  of  such  an  intervention.  Cost-effectiveness
plays  a central  role  in this  framework,  but only  alongside  the health-loss  criterion  which
incorporates  a special  concern  for the  worse  off and  promotes  fairness.  In  line  with  this,
cost-effectiveness  thresholds  are  differentiated  according  to health  loss.  Concrete  imple-Patient participation
Health care rationing
mentation  tools  and  open  processes  with  user  participation  complement  the  three  criteria.
Informed  by  the proposal,  the  Ministry  of  Health  and  Care  Services  is  preparing  a report
to the Parliament,  with  the  aim  of reaching  political  consensus  on  a  new  priority-setting
framework  for Norway.
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1. Background
Health systems worldwide struggle to meet increasing
demands for health care. This is true across all payer
systems and for rich and poor countries alike [1,2]. To
manage increasing demands is a challenge also for Norway,
despite being one of the richest countries in the world and
having a long tradition of systematic priority setting at the
national level [3]. In response, the third Norwegian Com-
mittee on Priority Setting in the Health Sector recently
laid out a new, comprehensive framework for setting
priorities. This paper presents and discusses that proposal.
is is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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The ﬁrst Norwegian priority-setting committee was
ppointed by the Cabinet in 1985 [4]. The impetus was the
ecognition that technological innovation called for an in-
epth assessment of the relationship between medicine,
thics, and economics. In its mandate, the Committee was
sked to consider ﬁve principles or dimensions: severity of
isease; equal opportunities for treatment (independently
f geographic, social, and age-dependent differences);
aiting time; health-economic aspects; and the patient’s
esponsibility for his or her condition. In its ﬁnal report
 years later, the Committee suggested that all ﬁve were
mportant, but recommended severity of disease as the
ain criterion for priority setting.
In 1996, the Cabinet appointed the second ofﬁcial
riority-setting committee to update the existing priority-
etting guidelines. The underlying motivation was the ever
ncreasing possibilities for diagnosis and treatment, as well
s an increasing number of elderly and chronically ill
eople. On top of this, the criteria proposed by the ﬁrst com-
ittee were seen as too general and as leaving too much
oom for individual interpretation and judgment. In its ﬁnal
eport the following year, the Committee proposed three
riteria: severity of disease, beneﬁt, and cost-effectiveness
5]. The Committee’s recommendations provided the basis
or the subsequent Patients’ Rights Act, priority-setting reg-
lations, national guidelines for priority setting, and the
stablishment of a permanent council for priority setting
n health care [6].
Even with this system in place, the run-up to the
eneral election in 2013 was dominated by heated
ebates on health policy and priority setting. There was
onsiderable disagreement as to whether certain expen-
ive cancer drugs—and ipilimumab for skin cancer in
articular—should be reimbursed by the state, and the
xisting criteria were again widely considered as being too
nspeciﬁc to provide guidance in such difﬁcult situations
7]. Against this backdrop, the Cabinet appointed in June
013 a third committee; the Norwegian Committee on Pri-
rity setting in the Health Sector. The 14 members were
elected by the Ministry of Health and Care Services with
he aim of representing a wide range of stakeholders and
ypes of expertise. The Committee was chaired by a physi-
ian and professor of medical ethics, and other members
ncluded two patient representatives, two practicing clin-
cians, two high-level directors in the health sector, two
ormer members of parliament, and professors of ethics,
aw, and economics. All members had the same standing,
ncluding the user representatives. The ﬁnal report, enti-
led “Open and fair – priority setting in the health service”,
as released on November 12, 2014 [8].
. The new framework
The Committee proposed a new framework for priority
etting in Norway. The framework comprises four general
rinciples. Priority setting should:pursue the goal of “the greatest number of healthy life
years for all, fairly distributed”;
be based on clear criteria; 120 (2016) 246–251 247
• be open, systematic, and involve user participation; and
• be supported by a coherent set of effective instruments.
The ﬁrst principle underscores that the goal is not only
to maximise population health, but also to ensure that
healthy life years are fairly distributed. This goal lays the
foundation for a set of criteria, processes, and instruments.
2.1. Criteria
Clear criteria are crucial for systematic priority setting
[9,10]. The Committee proposed three criteria:
• The health-beneﬁt criterion:  The priority of an inter-
vention increases with the expected health beneﬁt (and
other relevant welfare beneﬁts) from the intervention
• The resource criterion:  The priority of an intervention
increases, the less resources it requires
• The health-loss criterion: The priority of an intervention
increases with the expected lifetime health loss of the
beneﬁciary in the absence of such an intervention.
These criteria are to be considered together and applied
throughout the health sector, which includes all regulators,
payers, and providers within the national health system.
At the same time, the way the criteria are used will differ
across the decision-making levels. At the macro level, one
may  utilize the most precise forms of the three criteria and
conduct elaborate, quantitative analyses of beneﬁts, costs,
and health losses. At the micro level, health personnel can
employ the general deﬁnitions of the three criteria upon
which to exert their clinical judgment.
2.1.1. Summary of the criteria
The health-beneﬁt criterion is primarily concerned with
beneﬁts in terms of healthy life years, and it can thus be
applied to any type of intervention. One measure of this
kind is quality-adjusted life years (QALYs), which is much
debated, yet widely used in many countries [11,12].
The resource criterion is motivated by a concern for
opportunity costs. Within a given budget, the implemen-
tation of one intervention implies health beneﬁts forgone
elsewhere. The criterion pertains to both ﬁnancial and non-
ﬁnancial resources, including health personnel, hospital
beds, and medical equipment. A cost-effectiveness crite-
rion can represent the health-beneﬁt and resource criteria.
The extent to which it does partly depends on whether the
effectiveness unit correspond to “beneﬁts” as given by the
health-beneﬁt criterion and whether the costs adequately
captures “resources” as given by the resource criterion.
The health-loss criterion is intended to capture a key
aspect of fairness: the concern for the worse off. The Com-
mittee suggested that the worse off are those who  have
a larger health loss over the course of their lifetime as a
result of their condition [13,14]. This loss was deﬁned as the
difference between a long and healthy life, and the length
and quality of life of the patient group. This loss reﬂected
current, past, and future health.
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Fig. 1. Health losses and health-loss classes associated with selected conditions.
Health-loss class 1 includes target groups with a health loss between 0 and 15 healthy life years; class 2 includes those with a greater loss, up to 30; and
class  3 includes target groups with a loss between 30 and 45 healthy life years. Estimates are based on illustrative data from the National Institute for
Health  and Care Excellence (NICE), in the UK, for a limited set of interventions [15]. NICE provided information about the groups’ average age and average
remaining QALYs without the intervention in question. Information about age was combined with quality-adjustment weights to estimate average healthy
life  years in the past. The weights were based on data for Norway from the Global Burden of Disease Study 2010 and from Statistics Norway [16]. NICE’s
estimate for the remaining QALYs without the intervention was  then added to the estimate for past QALYs, and this sum was subtracted from the reference
level  of 80. The resulting lifetime health loss is inﬂuenced both by the general population-related health loss of the target group and by the additional
ver, thehealth loss that the group experiences because of their condition. Howe
from  the condition, as data were lacking.
2.1.2. The new health-loss criterion
The health-loss criterion addresses the core problem
with setting priorities solely on the basis of magnitude
of beneﬁts or cost-effectiveness, namely the problem that
it ignores the distribution of beneﬁts and is unconcerned
with how badly off people are, as long as the total beneﬁts
are the same [1,14]. The introduction of a health-loss cri-
terion can thus make cost-effectiveness information more
relevant and useful.
The health-loss criterion was speciﬁed step-by-step, in
a way that also eventually allowed for quantiﬁcation of
health loss. As a starting point, the Committee suggested
that a long and healthy life could be speciﬁed by 80 healthy
life years. This reference level was based on a range of nor-
mative and practical considerations and nearly coincides
with life expectancy at birth in Norway. However, it was
made clear that the exact number is arbitrary and that any
reference level needs to be reviewed and debated.
The Committee demonstrated how lifetime health loss
could be estimated using data that are increasingly avail-
able. One illustration built on data from the National estimates do not fully reﬂect the historic loss of quality of life resulting
Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) for a
selected set of new interventions. This is shown in Fig. 1.
Information about the target groups’ average age and
remaining quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) without the
intervention in question was used to estimate lifetime
health loss.
Fig. 1 demonstrates a wide variation in losses of healthy
life years across conditions. It also shows how the condi-
tions can be grouped into three categories according to
lifetime health loss. Such a grouping was suggested as a
means of facilitating understanding, communication, and
ease of use.
The proposed measure of health loss aligns with sev-
eral other measures [1,14,17]. Among these is the absolute
QALY shortfall measure, which has been considered by
NICE for some time and about which the ﬁnal deci-
sion is still to be made [18,19]. As it is usually deﬁned,
QALY shortfall integrates only present and future health
loss—although past length of life, i.e., age, inﬂuences indi-
rectly. A criterion based on relative QALY shortfall has
also been proposed by others and is being considered by
T. Ottersen et al. / Health Policy 120 (2016) 246–251 249
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tig. 2. Staircase model for cost-effectiveness thresholds with illustrative
,000 Norwegian kroner (NOK) ≈ 110 Euro (EUR). 250,000 NOK ≈ 28,000
10,000 EUR (as of June 30, 2015).
ICE. Relative QALY shortfall is commonly deﬁned as the
atio between disease-related QALY loss and the remaining
ALYs in absence of disease (relative to age and gender)
20]. The Committee found this use of relative shortfall
nwarranted, primarily due to its lack of a lifetime per-
pective and its inadequate sensitivity to the size of future
osses. With regard to the terminology, the Committee sug-
ested that ‘severity’ is often understood in a way that is
ore focused on current quality of life and prospective
ealth than lifetime health loss [21].
.1.3. Rejected criteria
In its mandate, the Committee was asked to con-
ider criteria related to end-of-life care, age, lack of
lternative treatment, innovation, and rare diseases. It
rgued that these characteristics were only relevant to
he extent that they were indicators for beneﬁt, resource
se, or health loss. For example, age was deemed rele-
ant only to the extent it informed the use of the beneﬁt,
esource, or health-loss criteria. The Committee there-
ore recommended that the other criteria—and age in
articular—should not be included in the priority-setting
ramework as independent criteria.
.1.4. Balancing the criteria
The Committee further suggested how the three criteria
ould be balanced against each other. A key feature of the
roposal is to assign weights to health beneﬁts according to
he health loss of the beneﬁciary. As a starting point, a sim-
le rule—the “1–2–3 rule”—was proposed, which could be
asily understood and used by multiple decision-makers.
ccording to this rule, the weight increases gradually with
ealth loss. More speciﬁcally, the weight assigned to the
mallest health loss in health-loss classes 1, 2, and 3 in Fig. 1,
s 1, 2, 3, respectively. Weights for losses greater than those
n class 3 were not speciﬁed.
.2. Cost-effectiveness thresholds
The three criteria can be used either to directly rank
ompeting interventions or together with predeﬁned
hresholds. Cost-effectiveness thresholds have been intro-
uced informally in Norway, but never examined and
pproved by Parliament. The Committee found that such
hresholds could help facilitate priority-setting based on
he three proposed criteria. In particular, thresholds were
een as useful in situations where the decision-maker has
ittle information about the interventions competing for
he same resources [22,23]. The Committee recommended
hat such thresholds be based on the opportunity cost ofld values.
0,000 NOK ≈ 57,000 EUR. 750,000 NOK ≈ 85,000 EUR. 1,000,000 NOK ≈
implementing the intervention being considered. Within
the health sector, this will largely correspond to the value
of the health beneﬁts foregone, given the implementation
of one particular intervention instead of another. It was
argued that for a focal choice situation, the threshold most
directly reﬂecting the opportunity cost is equal to the
average cost of a healthy life year—adjusted for health
loss—for marginal changes in the health budget. This is
the situation where the decision-maker has little or no
information about the interventions being displaced if the
intervention being evaluated is deemed cost-effective;
a situation resembling that of NICE. This understanding
of the threshold is also in line with a recent proposal
for the NICE cost-effectiveness threshold, which sug-
gests a threshold of about £13,000 (D 20,000) per QALY
based on data from the English National Health Service
(NHS) [22].
Rather than one single threshold value, the Committee
recommended multiple thresholds, differentiated accord-
ing to the average health loss of the target group. This
approach is consistent with the three proposed criteria, as
it combines the concern for beneﬁts, costs, and health loss,
and it balances the need for explicit limits with the need for
ﬂexibility. A “staircase model” illustrated thresholds val-
ues based on the aforementioned threshold for the English
NHS. The NHS threshold was  converted into Norwegian
kroner, adjusted for differences in health spending, and
then combined with the 1–2–3 rule to differentiate thresh-
olds according to degrees of health loss. It was  assumed that
the displaced QALY was associated with the lower part of
the range for health loss class 1. Fig. 2 shows the proposed
model with illustrative threshold values.
An intervention whose target group belongs to health
loss class 2 can be used as an example. The cost-
effectiveness ratio of such an intervention could be
regarded as reasonable up to 750,000 Norwegian kro-
ner (D 85,000) per healthy life year. The staircase model
includes thresholds that are both higher and lower than the
cost-effectiveness thresholds most frequently used in the
UK and the US. The threshold employed by NICE in the UK is
typically £20,000–30,000 (D 28,000–42,000) per QALY,[24]
while an informal threshold of $50,000 (D 45,000) per QALY
is commonly used in the US [25].
As the threshold values used were merely illustrative,
the Committee also laid out the key steps to establishing
a set of operative thresholds. First, the average cost of
gaining a healthy life year for marginal changes in the Nor-
wegian health budget should be estimated. Second, health
loss should be taken into account by adjusting the esti-
mate so that there are higher thresholds for interventions
lth Policy250 T. Ottersen et al. / Hea
targeting patients with greater loss. The magnitude of
these equity-based adjustments will depend on the weight
assigned to concern for the worse off vis-à-vis concern for
maximising health beneﬁts. Against this background, it
was called for a large research study on the opportunity
costs in the Norwegian health sector, more research on the
distributive preferences of Norwegian citizens, and further
public deliberation on the equity weights to be used.
2.3. Processes
Substantive goals and criteria must be complemented
with legitimate processes [26,27]. The Committee empha-
sised the need for transparency in the decision-making
process and described how the Accountability for Rea-
sonableness framework provides useful guidance for
improving legitimacy [27,28]. At the same time, it was
acknowledged that there are legitimate limitations to
openness. In particular, the Committee highlighted the
advantages and disadvantages of transparency during and
after negotiations between reimbursers and manufactur-
ers of drugs, as manufacturers often offer discounts on the
condition that the reimburser does not make the price it
pays publicly available.
The need for user participation and shared decision
making was also emphasised. Issues regarding autonomy,
quality of care, and fairness all call for a redeﬁned, more
expansive role for patients and relatives in priority-setting
processes. This was reﬂected in the Committee’s own work
with the inclusion of two user representatives and the
establishment of a website asking for public input. The
Committee also initiated a Citizen Panel study with 1,653
participants, where the participants were asked about
their views on the need for priority setting, the role of
priority-setting processes, and the importance of different
priority-setting criteria [29]. The responses from this panel
provided input to the Committee’s deliberation and, in par-
ticular, identiﬁed topics for in-depth discussion. Part of the
responses were also presented directly in the report.
2.4. Instruments
The Committee made clear that priority setting should
be supported by a coherent set of effective instruments.
These instruments are to help decision-makers act in accor-
dance with agreed goals, criteria, and processes, but also
to help build agreement in the ﬁrst place. Speciﬁcally, the
Committee emphasised harmonisation of law and regula-
tions and integration of the new criteria. It recommended
that priority setting should be seen as a key leadership
responsibility, as well as a central part of education and
training of health personnel and user representatives. The
importance of supporting and reﬁning the existing priority-
setting institutions was emphasised, and among these
were the clinical ethics committees, the standing council
on priority setting, and the national system for the intro-
duction of new technologies. The Committee highlighted
overtreatment and unnecessary variation of care as issues
in need of urgent attention, and it suggested establishing a
Norwegian Health Atlas to identify and monitor local prac-
tice variations. 120 (2016) 246–251
Finally, the Committee demonstrated how improved
collection and use of information, development and use
of guidelines, and design of ﬁnancing mechanisms can
motivate and help actors to make better decisions. Among
the ﬁnancing mechanisms, differentiated user fees was
emphasised. It was  recommended that the government
consider increasing fees for low-priority services, while
reducing or eliminating fees for high-priority services.
Examples from the former category included blepharo-
plasty (eye-lid surgery) and surgery for uncomplicated
varicose veins. Examples from the latter category included
medical primary prevention of diabetes complications and
of cardiovascular disease for certain high-risk groups. The
Committee emphasised that differentiated user fees need
not result in an increase of out-of-pocket payments overall.
2.5. Conclusion: next steps and lessons for other
countries
The Committee’s report attracted considerable atten-
tion in the national media and generated a lively debate, in
which the Minister of Health and Care Services actively par-
ticipated. The Minister argued against those who claimed
that there was no need to set priorities in Norway, he
emphasised that priority setting is already a regular fea-
ture in today’s system, asserted the need for clearer
criteria, and encouraged a democratic debate about the
proposal and priority setting in general. At the same time,
Norway’s largest newspaper launched an online priority-
setting game, with a built-in opportunity to submit advice
to the Minister. The most debated topics were the need for
priority setting in an economically privileged country like
Norway; the use of the health-loss criterion and its rela-
tion to age; differentiated user fees; and the relevance and
ease of use of the three proposed criteria in clinical settings.
Already the day after the launch of the report, the chair of
the Decision Forum of the national system for the introduc-
tion of new health technologies announced that the Forum
would expand to include a patient representative.
The Ministry of Health and Care Services initiated a
nationwide hearing following the completion of the report.
Many responses were positive to the four general princi-
ples, but many also thought that the health-loss criterion
was  unnecessary complex and unduly biased against the
elderly. While many supported the prospective aspects of
the health-loss criterion, there was  much less support for
including past health, in terms of both age and past qual-
ity losses. Against this background, the Ministry decided
not to pursue a lifetime health-loss criterion and estab-
lished a working group to consider alternative measures,
under the rubric of “severity”, that are more concentrated
on prospective health. The working group recommended to
not include past health losses in the assessment of sever-
ity, but aligned with the Committee’s recommendations in
many other respects [32]. For the group level, the working
group suggested to assess severity in terms of absolute loss
of prognosis. This was deﬁned as the absolute reduction in
future healthy life years for people with the disease, when
compared with what people at the same age but without
the disease can expect. For clinical practice, the working
group recommended to assess severity based on a range of
th Policy
f
c
i
l
t
p
s
m
o
t
s
t
g
o
g
p
b
s
p
s
m
c
e
c
e
r
C
F
M
i
A
w
R
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[T. Ottersen et al. / Heal
actors, including risk of death or disability and pain, dis-
omfort, and loss of future life years. Age inﬂuences severity
ndirectly under both interpretations, especially through
oss in future life years, but this inﬂuence is less transparent
han for lifetime health loss. Informed by the Committee’s
roposal and the working group’s recommendations on
everity, the Ministry will submit a report to the Parlia-
ent in 2016 with the aim of reaching political consensus
n a new priority-setting framework for Norway.
Norway’s approach to priority setting may  be of interest
o regulators, payers, and providers in other countries for
everal reasons: the existing approach is based on open,
ransparent process and debate; priority setting is inte-
rated into laws and regulations; a standing committee
n priority setting exists; and standardised priority-setting
uidelines for medical specialities are used. The new pro-
osal goes further and may  be particularly interesting
ecause of its combination of comprehensiveness and
peciﬁc guidance. The proposal seeks to integrate goals,
rinciples, criteria, processes, and instruments for priority
etting into a coherent whole and give concrete recom-
endations. In addition, the proposed criteria go beyond
ost-effectiveness to emphasise fairness directly.
The Committee beneﬁted greatly from insights and
xperiences in other countries, and its recommendations
an similarly be helpful for others. Only by learning from
ach other can regulators, payers, and providers best
espond to the common challenge of priority setting.
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